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The Multilateral Agreement on
Investment and International
Labor Rights:
A Failed Connection
Lance Compa*
Introduction
After law school, I worked as a union organizer and negotiator for the
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE). Since the
early 1950's, the UE represented workers at a General Electric Co. plant in
Baltimore, Maryland, that produced porcelain insulators for electric power
transmission lines. In 1975, GE announced it would dose the plant, put-
ting more than 500 workers out of their jobs, unless a buyer could be
found.
Ajapanese firm called NGK Ltd., the largest porcelain insulator manu-
facturer in Japan, bought the plant. NGK Ltd. made large investments in
new equipment and technology, introduced new engineering systems, and
expanded the facility. The new company also recognized the union,
assumed the existing collective bargaining agreement (the sale took place
during the term of the contract with GE), and bargained in good faith for a
series of contracts in the years after it bought the plant. The Japanese firm
even agreed to a "union shop" provision, something GE had never
conceded.'
The relationship should not be sugar-coated. There were occasional
strikes and layoffs, and the union resisted company appeals to accept Japa-
nese-style labor-management cooperation schemes. But for nearly a quar-
ter-century after its imminent shutdown, the plant has been a thriving
* Senior Lecturer, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York; formerly Director of Labor Law and Economic
Research, Secretariat of the North American Commission for Labor Cooperation, Dallas,
Texas. B.A., Fordham University, 1969; J.D., Yale Law School, 1973. Support for this
Article was provided by the research and writing program of the John D. and Catherine
T. MacArthur Foundation.
1. "Union shop" is a phrase used in U.S. labor relations to describe a contract
clause that requires employees covered by a collective agreement to become union mem-
bers and pay union dues, or to pay the equivalent of union dues in an agency relation-
ship if they choose not to become union members. Such "union security" arrangements
are normally a top priority for trade unions in bargaining, since the arrangements help
maintain stable financial support for union activities. See generally E. EDWARD HERMAN
ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & LABOR RELA-TONS 369 (2d ed. 1987); Steven E. Abra-
ham, How the Taft-Hartley Act Hindered Unions, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 23 (1994).
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enterprise in working-class South Baltimore with a strong, active local
union and good wages and benefits for company employees.
This essay starts with an anecdote to suggest that foreign direct invest-
ment can serve workers' interests when their rights are respected. The
rewards of investment should not be limited to U.S. workers, either. Work-
ers around the world can benefit from investment flows linked to policies
that advance workers' labor rights and living standards.
In this light, an investment agreement that promotes stability, predict-
ability, the rule of law, and fairness in international trade can be a positive
force for a "high road" dynamic in the rapidly globalizing economy, if it
takes workers' rights into account. However, if such an agreement fails to
incorporate strong protection for labor rights, it can make inevitable a "low
road" of worker exploitation in global trade and investment flows. 2
Other critics in this symposium, and in the broader public debate over
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), offer detailed critiques of
proposed MAI rules on national treatment, most-favored-nation status, per-
formance requirements, expropriation, investor-state dispute settlement
procedures, and other measures.3 Vigorous criticism contributed to the
MAI's apparent demise, at least for the time being, in the Organisation of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 4
2. "High road" versus "low road" is a common distinction in international labor
rights discourse, at least among labor rights advocates. The former generally refers to
employment policies promoting workers' education and training, high skills, high
wages, high productivity, strong unions, universal social insurance, high labor stan-
dards, effective enforcement of labor laws, and other characteristics of a thriving indus-
trial democracy with growth in workers' living standards. The latter generally implies
violations of workers' rights, restrictions on union organizing and collective bargaining,
deliberate suppression of wages below levels that workers' productivity should afford
them, widespread sweatshop conditions that may include child labor, exclusion of large
groups of workers (often women and minorities) from the formal labor market, and
other features of a labor market that fail to serve workers but may sustain the enrich-
ment of owners and investors. For discussion and analysis of high road/low road
approaches, see NATIONAL CTR. ON EDUC. AND THE ECON., AMERICA'S CHOICE: HIGH SKILLS
OR Low WAGES! (1990); Michael J. Piore, Labor Standards and Business Strategies, in
LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 35 (Stephen A. Herzenberg
&Jorge F. Perez-Lopez eds., 1990); Richard Freeman, A Hard-Headed Look at Labor Stan-
dards, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (U.S.
Dept. of Labor ed., 1994); Stephen Herzenberg, In From the Margins: Morality, Econom-
ics, and International Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
3. Such a global critique is not the topic of this paper. Extensive anti-MAI literature
has emerged in the past two years. Much of it is Internet-driven or of the journalistic op-
ed variety; the slow pace of academic publishing makes for scant scholarly treatment
thus far. For a recent comprehensive treatment, see StephanJ. Kobrin, The MAI and the
Clash of Globalizations, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Fall 1998, at 97-109. See Public Citizen (visited
Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.citizen.org> (providing popular criticism). See also DAVID
KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RutL THE WORLD (1996); Noam Chomsky, Domestic Con-
stituencies: MAI, the Further Corporatization of America and the World, Z MAG., May
1998, at 16-25. Mainstream economists are also beginning to caution against the
excesses of free market policies that insufficiently account for social concerns. See, e.g.,
DAhN RODERIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1997).
4. SeeJane Bussey, New Rules Could Guide International Investment: Efforts to Draft
Accord Meet Criticism, MIAMI HERALD, July 20, 1997, at 1F; Paul Magnusson & Stephen
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This essay analyzes the labor rights provisions of the MAI draft text5
and compares them with labor rights regimes in other international con-
texts. The essay first examines the MAI's labor rights provisions. Then it
undertakes two critiques of these provisions. One critique discusses the
inadequacy of MAI labor clauses on their own terms, applying general
rules of language construction without reference to other, comparable
instruments. The second critique seeks to show how the MAI's labor rights
language falls far short of labor rights provisions in other international
agreements and related instruments. Finally, this essay provides a detailed
summary and analysis of labor rights clauses in international instruments
and suggests how a restructured MAI might incorporate such features.
I. Labor Rights Language in the MAI
A. Labor Rights Clauses in the MAI's Draft Text
MAI negotiators should be credited with recognizing the need to address
labor rights in the Agreement and for conceding, at least in principle, that
violating workers' rights should not be a means of gaining a comparative
advantage in trade and investment. However, the language in the draft text
is unable to protect, let alone promote, labor rights and labor standards in
global commerce.
The draft text of the MAI contains three clauses on labor rights and
labor standards: one in the preamble calling for "commitment" to core
labor standards, one in the body of the text with a "not lowering standards"
caution, and one in an annex incorporating OECD guidelines that contain
certain labor provisions.
1. Preamble
First, a declaration in the MAI's Preamble would have Parties "[R]enewing
their commitment ... to the observance of internationally recognized core
labor standards"6 and "[a]ffirming their support for the OECD Guidelines
Baker, The Explosive Trade Deal You've Never Heard Of, Bus. WK., Feb. 9, 1998, at 51;
Madelaine Drohan, How the Net Killed the MAI: Grassroots Groups Used Their Own
Globalization to Derail Deal, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 29, 1998, at 1.
5. See Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment: The MAI Negotiating Text (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/
daf/cmis/mai/negtext.htm> [hereinafter MAI Negotiating Text].
6. Id. art. I(Preamble). Core labor standards are defined as freedom of association,
the right to organize and bargain collectively, prohibition of forced labor, the elimination
of exploitative forms of child labor, and non-discrimination in employment. In general,
the term "core" rights or standards (sometimes called "human rights" standards) refers
to norms with universal application regardless of a country's or an employer's level of
development or technology. "Non-core" or "economic" rights or standards refer to
norms that may vary with the level of development. For example, minimum wage
requirements and social insurance protection are often included in this category. It
must also be recognized that several important labor norms, such as limits on child
labor and occupational safety and health protection, have both "core" properties and
"economic" properties. Developing countries may generally maintain a lower age for
admission to employment (14 years of age versus 16 in developed countries, for exam-
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for Multinational Enterprises . . .which are non-binding and which are
observed on a voluntary basis .... 7
2. Body
Second, in the body of the MAI text under the heading "Not Lowering Stan-
dards," the Parties would agree that it is "inappropriate to encourage invest-
ment by relaxing... [domestic][core] labour standards." This clause goes
on to say that "[I]f a Party considers that another Party has offered such
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party, and the
two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encourage-
ment."9 In the same draft clause, an alternative formulation would state
that a Party "[shall][should] not waive or otherwise derogate
from ... [domestic] labor standards" to encourage foreign investment in
the country.1 0
3. Annex
A third clause on labor rights appears under the heading "Relationship to
Other International Agreements" and suggests "associating" the OECD
Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises to the MAI." The OECD Guide-
lines' section on Employment and Industrial Relations contains a nine-
point proclamation that multinational enterprises "should" respect various
trade union rights, such as affording information and consultation to
workers' representatives. 12 The OECD states explicitly that "observance of
the Guidelines is voluntary and not legally enforceable.' 13
For such an association, negotiators propose an annex to the MAI con-
taining the OECD Guidelines. Parties to the MAI would be "encouraged to
participate in the Guidelines work of the [OECD] in order to promote co-
operation... and to facilitate the maintenance of consensus"1 4 on matters
addressed in the Guidelines. However, annexation of the Guidelines to the
MAI "shall not bear on the interpretation or application of the Agreement,
including for the purpose of dispute settlement; nor change [the Guide-
ple), and they are not expected to require expensive, state-of-the-art occupational safety
and health technology in workplaces. At the same time, bonded child labor, labor by
extremely young children, or failing to provide minimal health and safety protection to
guard against serious injury or illness, cannot be conceded on the basis of a lower level
of development.
7. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OCDE/GD(97)40 (1997)
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. The OECD Guidelines were adopted in 1976 and have
been periodically updated since then. An "Employment and Industrial Relations" sec-
tion of the Guidelines contains nine points on labor rights. For more discussion, see
infra note 12 and accompanying text.
8. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 5, art. III(Not Lowering Standards). Brack-
eted words or phrases reflect options that are still under debate.
9. Id.
10. 'Id.
11. Id. art. X; see OECD Guidelines, supra note 7.
12. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 7, at 46-47.
13. Id. at 7.
14. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 5, art. X.
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lines'] non-binding character."' 5 Finally, an introduction to the annex
would hold out the Guidelines as "a joint recommendation by participating
governments to multinational enterprises operating in their territory ... to
help multinational enterprises ensure that their operations are in harmony
with other national policies of the countries in which they operate."1 6
With so much encouragement, consultation, cooperation, and har-
mony in the MAI negotiators' draft language on labor rights, an unin-
formed observer may well ask why this issue is so controversial, and why
popular protest on labor rights, among other causes, contributed to the
MAI's downfall. 17 The problem is that the negotiators' language trivializes
the realities of labor rights violations related to trade and investment and
their effect on workers in the new, globalizing economy' 8 and falls far
short of labor rights protection in other international instruments. 19
B. Two Critiques of the MAI Labor Rights Language
The MAI's treatment of labor rights gives rise to two central critiques.
First, on its own terms, without comparing it with any other instrument,
the MAI draft text is woefully lacking in labor rights substance. Negotia-
tors set forth no clear norms of behavior for governments or multinational
investors, created no binding obligations on them, set up no mechanism to
scrutinize government or enterprise treatment of workers, and established
no penalties, economic or otherwise, when investors violate workers'
rights. Second, the MAI lags far behind other international trade regimes
and their more extensive and sophisticated treatment of labor rights. Fif-
teen years ago, the MAI's labor rights language might have been worthy of
attention. Today, it has been overtaken by developments in the labor rights
field that make the MAI negotiators' attempts at dealing with labor rights
seem shallow.
1. MAI On Its Own Terms
a. Preamble
A statement of "commitment" to core labor standards or "support" for
OECD Guidelines in the Preamble to the MAI is no more than a weak
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See Valerie Lawton, Global Investment Talks Collapse Without Deal, ToRoNTO STAR,
Oct. 21, 1998, at 1; Guy dejonquieres, Retreat Over OECD Pact on Investment, FiN. TIMES
(London) Oct. 21, 1998, at 4 (citing the lack of strong labor rights protection and trade
union opposition as contributing to the collapse of MAI negotiations).
18. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) produces an
annual report on workers' rights violations around the world, with special attention to
the imprisonment or murder of trade unionists. The report is available at the ICFTU's
website at <http://www.icftu.org>. The International Labor Organization provides simi-
lar information, with lengthy documentation of child labor abuses around the world, at
<http://www.ilo.org>. The U.S. Labor Department has also produced a four-volume
study of child labor which is available at the Department's website at <http://
www.dol.gov>. For another recent, vivid account of labor rights violations around the
world, see WILUIAM GPEIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR Nor (1997).
19. See infra Part I.B.2.
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exhortation that creates no obligations among signatories, let alone any
implementation mechanism.
Both the definition of "core" labor standards and the content of the
Guidelines are excessively narrow. Core standards cover only freedom of
association, collective bargaining, child labor, forced labor, and discrimina-
tion. While their importance cannot be questioned, "core" standards leave
aside matters like the right to strike, workplace health and safety, migrant
worker protection, minimum wages that provide decent living standards,
job security, social insurance, adjustment assistance for workers displaced
by trade, and other vital workers' concerns. These rights and standards are
affected perhaps even more than "core" concerns by trade and investment
pressures on many governments to deregulate their domestic labor
markets.20
"Commitment" to core standards has no effect without a mechanism
to hold parties accountable for their actions. A preamble statement may be
useful as a basis for criticizing a country's failure to respect core labor stan-
dards. However, without a system for filing complaints and putting a
party's conduct to a test of proof and defense and a method for imposing
sanctions where violations are established, this clause is merely a state-
ment of good intentions with no force.
A preamble statement of "support" for OECD Guidelines is likewise
wanting. First, the Guidelines are even narrower in scope than core labor
standards. Of the nine points in the Guidelines' "Employment and Indus-
trial Rdlations" section, seven cover collective bargaining and related issues,
one calls for training host country employees, and one urges non-discrimi-
nation in employment.
In general, the OECD Guidelines assume a mature collective bargain-
ing relationship reflecting institutional interests of large employer federa-
tions and trade union groupings that serve on OECD advisory
committees. 21 They make no mention of discrimination or violence
against workers who try to organize, child labor, forced labor, minimum
wages, occupational health and safety, migrant labor, job security, social
insurance, the right to strike, or other labor standards. While the OECD
creates a quasi-"complaint" mechanism (although the word "complaint" is
taboo; only "enquiries" are permitted), it has no enforcement regime to
deal with violations of the Guidelines. 22
b. "Not Lowering Standards"
Although it looks reasonable and widely applicable on its face, the clause
stating that MAI parties should not relax labor standards to attract invest-
20. The term "deregulation" in U.S. discourse is often characterized as "flexibiliza-
tion" in other countries.
21. The Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the Trade Union
Advisory Committee (TUAC) are accredited to the OECD as official advisory bodies
composed of business and labor federations in member countries. Both entities partici-
pated in MAI negotiations in their advisory capacity.
22. See infra Part I.B.l.c.
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ment is starved for content and marginal in application. The unresolved
choice between "domestic" and "core" standards is significant, with disad-
vantages attaching to each formulation. Using "core" standards instead of
"domestic" standards greatly narrows the range of working conditions cov-
ered by the clause, as noted above in the discussion of core standards in the
Preamble.
Using "domestic standards" could constrain cuts in such areas as min-
imum wages, social insurance benefits, or job security protection.23 How-
ever, it would relieve a country of the need to comply with international
"core" standards where its domestic law and practice may fall short of com-
pliance with core standards. For example, Malaysia severely limits
independent unionism in its important electronics sector (only unions that
are affiliated with the official government-sponsored union may be
formed). Until recently, Indonesia outlawed independent unions alto-
gether and imprisoned the most prominent independent labor leader.24
Both measures violate workers' freedom of association and right to bargain
collectively. In the United States, "right to work" laws in twenty-one states
obstruct the freedom of unions and employers to negotiate union shop
agreements, 2 5 and U.S. legal doctrine allows the permanent replacement of
strikers.26 These features of U.S. law arguably violate workers' rights of
association and collective bargaining when employers use them with the
intention of interfering with or destroying workers' rights of association
and collective bargaining.27 These laws would be unaffected by a MAI
labor rights provision proscribing cuts in domestic labor standards.
A "no-lowering" rule rewards countries with already low standards.
Such countries may retain whatever advantage they derive from their
domestic labor law and practice, even where it arguably violates workers'
rights, such as Malaysia's limits on unionization in its large electronics sec-
tor, or the United States' "right to work" laws and permanent striker
replacement doctrine. It also negates any pressure to improve labor stan-
dards, thus foreclosing any possible dynamic of "upward harmonization"
of labor rights linked to increased trade and investment flows.
23.. This leaves aside issues of exchange rates and the effects of currency devalua-
tions. Any country could effectively "cut" wages in the global marketplace by devaluing
its currency.
24. On both Malaysia and Indonesia, see OECD, TRADE, EMPLOYmENT AND LABOuR
STANDARDs: A STUDY OF CORE WoRKERs' RIGHTs AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 58 (1996);
Cindy Shiner, Cries of Freedom Sound in Jakarta: New Regime Releases 2 Political Prison-
ers, WASH. PosT, May 26, 1998, at All.
25. See discussion and sources cited supra note 1; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69, 164(b)
(1994). The term "right to work" does not appear in Section 14(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act. "Right to work" is a colloquial expression used to describe state laws
forbidding employers and unions from agreeing to require dues payments from all repre-
sented employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Of the 50 states, 21 have
such "right to work" laws, most of them in the South and Southwest.
26. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
27. See, e.g., ILO Committee on Freedom of Association No. 1543, 74 Official Bull.,
Ser.B, No. 2, 278th Rep., 15 (1991) (on the permanent replacement of striking workers).
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Even more artfully, the clause proposed here would forbid lowering
standards only "as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition,
expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. ' 28
The constraint only applies to a specific act of lowering a labor standard to
attract a specific investment from a specific investor. For example, Malay-
sia might say to a U.S. electronics firm contemplating a new factory: "[W]e
already restrict independent union organization in the electronics sector,
but if you make this investment, we will ban outright all unionization in the
sector." Or New York State might say to a large European auto company
deciding whether to invest in South Carolina (a "right to work" state) or in
New York (a state where union security clauses are permitted): "[I1f you
invest here, we will pass a 'right to work' law in New York."2 9
Presumably, such offers would be captured by the MAI's language bar-
ring specific quid pro quo lowering of labor standards (whether the offer
would be prevented by the MAI is another matter - there is no mechanism
to enforce it). However, a decision by Malaysia to enact a general ban on
unionization, or by New York to pass a "right to work" law, would not be
reached by the MAI because it is not an encouragement of an investment by
an investor. It is a general lowering of labor standards to create a more
favorable climate for investors. The MAI does nothing to constrain such
measures.
MAI negotiators also did not resolve the "should not waive" versus
"shall not waive" labor standards debate. "Should" is simply hortatory.
"Shall" suggests a binding obligation, but the MAI contains no mechanism
for testing whether a country has complied with such an obligation. The
lack of any forum for filing complaints or obtaining redress under MAI
labor rights provisions reduces the "shall" to another exhortation with no
practical effect.
c. Associating OECD Guidelines
In addition to the narrow scope of the OECD Guidelines' labor provisions,
the explicit reminder in the MAI of their "non-binding character" demon-
strates the negotiators' indifference to whether labor standards might
improve in connection with expanded trade and investment. The OECD
Guidelines set up a complicated system of "contact points" in government
agencies that "identify and clarify issues that may arise in the Guidelines'
application."3 o
28. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 5, art. IlIIntellectual Property) (emphasis
added).
29. On the right-to-work law as an inducement to investment, see, for example,
Doron P. Levin, What BMW Sees in South Carolina, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at C5;
William Roberts, New South Sees Future and It's in Global Trade, J. CoM., Oct. 31, 1996, at
LA ("It was no accident that BMW chose South Carolina, a right to work state with little
union activity, as the site for its first and only North American manufacturing plant");
Kenneth Cole, Alabama's Benz, UAW Don't Mix: Unionizing a German Manufacturing
Plant in the Right-to-Work State Won't Be Easy, DETROIT NEws, May 10, 1998, at Cl.
30. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 7.
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Under OECD Guidelines, trade unions must lodge complaints about a
corporation's alleged violations of the guidelines with the "contact point"
of their own government, normally a designated individual (not very high-
ranking) in an executive agency. The "contact point" communicates the
concern to a counterpart in the country where the alleged violation took
place. The latter contact point may then discuss the issue with officials
from the offending company to urge corrective action, but there is no
means of compelling any correction under OECD procedures. 3 1
Complaints that identify a multinational enterprise as an alleged viola-
tor of the Guidelines are not permitted. Only "matters for consideration"
may be raised, and "the resulting clarification... is not a judgment on the
behavior of an enterprise, and thus does not refer to the enterprise by
name."
32
Despite its limitations, some unions have been able to use the OECD
Guidelines to advance their agenda, though more by public relations or
inter-union solidarity measures than through pressure brought from the
OECD. The United Mine Workers turned to the OECD following a 1988
labor dispute over layoff and recall protections at Enoxy Coal Co., a West
Virginia mine owned by ENI, the Italian state-run energy company. A com-
plex "exchange of views" was held among the union, the employers (both
the U.S. subsidiary and ENI), and government "contact points" who
obtained the views of their own ministries or departments. Piessure on the
Italian government by unions helped resolve the dispute to the UMWA's
satisfaction.3 3
In the 1980s, a U.S. union facing anti-labor conduct by the local man-
agement of a U.S. subsidiary of the Swedish Electrolux corporation used
the OECD contact points system. Swedish unions pressured their govern-
ment to persuade Swedish parent company managers to convince U.S.
executives to halt their objectionable conduct.34 In 1990, the United Food
and Commercial Workers made a similar move to the OECD in a dispute
with the Belgium-based Carrefour supermarket chain. International pres-
sure that included solidarity moves by Belgian unions brought about a set-
tlement in April 1991, by which the company recognized the union and
entered into bargaining.3 5
Success in advancing labor rights through the OECD Guidelines is
heavily dependent on just such idiosyncratic relationships. Swedish
unions, for example, represent ninety percent of the labor force there,
3 6
giving them weight in dealings with Swedish-based multinational firms.
The OECD system could hardly be transposed to the Indonesia of Presi-
31. For a detailed explanation, see id. at 11-17.
32. Id. at 15.
33. A management-side account of this and other labor disputes brought by unions
to the OECD is contained in B. Glade & E. Potter, Targeting the Labor Practices of Mul-
tinational Companies, Focus ON ISSUES (July 1989).
34. Id.
35. See David Wallace, Carrefour, Union Reach Truce in 2-Year Dispute, PHiLA. Bus. J.,
Feb. 19, 1990, at 1.
36. See IAr'L LABOR ORG. (ILO), WORLD LABOR REPORT 8 (1997).
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dent Suharto, for example, where a worker seeking to unionize might be
found dead in a river.37
2. The MAI Compared with Other Labor Rights Regimes
Since the early 1980s, several new legal and quasi-legal regimes have taken
shape to address labor rights in the global economy. Some are new, like
labor rights amendments to U.S. trade statutes since the mid 1980s, or the
1993 labor side-agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Others evolved from older frameworks, like the recent emer-
gence of "core labor standards" among Conventions of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) since its founding in 1919, or the growth of the
European social charter as the European Union (EU) expanded in member-
ship and scope of authority since six original partners signed the Treaty of
Rome in 1957.38
The premise of labor rights advocacy is a simple one: no country -
and no company operating in the country - should gain a competitive
advantage in global trade by killing union organizers, banning strikes,
using forced labor or brutalized child labor, or otherwise violating workers'
basic rights. Besides such fundamental human rights concerns, a labor
rights regime should also prevent government policies that deliberately
hold wages and working conditions below levels consistent with a dignified
workplace in a society with a fair distribution of wealth.
The challenge for labor rights advocates has been twofold. One chal-
lenge is to establish universal norms that comport with international law.
Another is to fashion a system of enforcement that moves such "law"
beyond a statement of good intentions - in the overworked metaphor, to
give "teeth" to the norms.39
37. See Merrill Goozner, Indonesia Ignores U.S. on Rights, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1994, at
22.
38. There is a rapidly growing amount of literature on international labor rights and
trade. For a recent comprehensive review of legal analysis, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Global
Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1533 (1998) (book review).
For a recent economic analysis, see GARY S. FIELDS, THE ROLE OF LABOR STANDARDS IN U.S.
TRADE PouciEs (1998) and sources cited therein.
39. "Teeth" abound in discussions of international labor rights. NAFTA's labor
agreement "lacks teeth to correct any wrongdoing," says U.S. Congressman Peter
DeFazio. Dean Calbreath, Lawmakers Condemn Maquiladora Firings, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Oct. 30, 1997, at Cl. A major union leader, CWA President Morton Bahr, asserts
that the side agreement "has no real teeth to enforce basic worker rights." Tim Shorrock,
Mexico Approves Union at Taiwan-owned Firm, J. COM., Apr. 18, 1997, at 3A. Speaking of
the ILO, a British analyst says its child labor efforts have failed "because they lacked
teeth." Michael Prest, Profit Bows to Ethics, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 26, 1997, at 3.
An ILO official concedes "the question is whether the ILO countries are willing to give
the ILO teeth to enforce its agenda." John Zarocostas, Labor Watchdog Stresses Core
Social Standards, J. CoM., Jan. 16, 1997, at 2A. A prominent U.S. trade analyst notes the
need to put teeth into UN agencies like the ILO, "which monitors treatment of workers
worldwide but lacks the power to condemn countries with egregious labor practices."
Jeffrey Garten, Congress Wages War on Free Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, May 28, 1997, at A21.
Another commentator calls the WTO's final declaration on labor rights "nice words
without teeth." Larry Weiss, Global Trade Pact on Worker Rights: More Nice Words With-
out Teeth, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Jan. 31, 1997, at 16A- Turning to Europe and its new
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A. Unilateral Measures
While neither of these challenges has been fully resolved, issues of interna-
tional labor rights and fair labor standards have moved high on the agenda
of world trade concerns in recent years. In the United States, a coalition of
trade union, human rights, religious, consumer, and allied groups suc-
ceeded in adding social conditionality to a range of trade and investment
legislation. Labor rights amendments have been added to statutes gov-
erning the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1984,40 the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation in 1985,41 the Caribbean Basin
Initiative in 1986,42 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1988,43 and Agency for
International Development (AID) funding for economic development
grants overseas.4 4
A 1994 act requires U.S. delegates to the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund and other international lending agencies to condition their
support for projects on labor rights guarantees. 4 5 Also, in 1997, Congress
adopted a measure prohibiting the importation of products made by
bonded child labor.46
The United States is not alone in developing a unilateral labor rights
regime. Acting as a bloc, the EU has also adopted a labor rights clause in
its GSP program. Rather than threatening sanctions against countries that
purportedly violate labor standards, the EU offers enhanced access to
European markets for developing countries that respect workers' freedom
of association, non-discrimination, and child labor protection.4 7
Works Council Directive requiring European firms to consult with worker representa-
tives on an EU-wide basis, the head of the European Commission "wants the law to have
teeth in the form of penalties against firms that flout the legal obligation to consult."
Charles Bremner, New Law Under Social Chapter Would Require Agreement on Sackings,
TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1997, at 1. An innocent observer might be excused for thinking the
debate is between competing schools of dentistry, but underneath the overworked meta-
phor is a serious debate about the appropriate mix of moral and economic sanctions
linking labor standards to international trade.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1996). The GSP program permits a developing country to
export goods to the United States on a preferential, duty-free basis as long as the country
meets the conditions for eligibility in the program.
41. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994). OPIC insures the overseas investments of U.S. corpo-
rations against losses due to war, revolution, expropriation or other factors related to
political turmoil, as long as the country receiving the investment meets conditions for
eligibility under OPIC insurance.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (1996). A 1990 labor rights amendment to what is now called
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) expanded the worker rights
clause to comport with GSP and OPIC formulations. CBERA grants duty-free status to
exports into the United States from Caribbean basin countries on a more extensive basis
than under GSP provisions.
43. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (1996). Section 301 defines various unfair trade practices,
now including worker rights violations, making a country that trades with the United
States liable to retaliatory action.
44. Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2151 (1994).
45. 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (1996).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1997).
47. See Neil Buckley, EU to Offer Tariff Carrot to Poor States, FIN. TIMES (London),
Oct. 30, 1997, at 5. For text of the clause, see Council Regulation 11541-98 of May 25,
1998, 1998 OJ. (L 160) 3-7.
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B. Regional Measures
The churning of labor rights initiatives is not confined to unilateral moves
by the United States or by Europe. Several new regional initiatives have
taken shape in recent years. The "Social Chapter" of the European Union
and its reaffirmation in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty incorporate a twelve-
point program of EU labor standards in the 1989 Community Charter of
Fundamental Rights of Workers. The Amsterdam Treaty allows for a
Europe-wide labor legislation on some of the twelve points, either by una-
nimity or by a qualified majority.48 However, the social chapter does not
apply to union organizing, collective bargaining, or the right to strike.
These matters are left exclusively to domestic law.4 9
In the Western hemisphere, social "linkage" advocates convinced the
Clinton administration to seek a supplemental labor agreement to NAFTA.
The labor side accord was then negotiated with Mexico and Canada.5 0 The
Mercosur group of South America's Southern Cone has created an Eco-
nomic and Social Consultative Forum (FCES) to treat labor standards in
their economic integration efforts. 5 1 The FCES includes an Economic and
Social Consulting Forum embracing unions, social movements, and other
NGOs from all member countries. Mercosur has also created a tripartite
Working Group 10 in which government, business, and union representa-
tives from member countries discuss labor relations, employment, and
social security matters. Finally, the Southern Cone countries have estab-
lished a Joint Parliamentary Committee where legislators from all member
countries come together to discuss regional trade and investment issues.5 2
C. Multilateral Developments
Besides labor rights developments at a unilateral level typified by the U.S.
GSP regime, and at a regional level like those of the EU, NAFTA, and
Mercosur, there has also been movement in multilateral settings. Impor-
tant labor rights considerations come into play in the United Nations, the
48. For a discussion, see European Trade Union Information Bulletin, The Amster-
dam Treaty: A Trade Union Guide (Sept. 30, 1997) <http://www.ecu-notes.org> [hereinaf-
ter The Amsterdam Treaty].
49. Id. art. 118(6).
50. The strength of the labor side accords is a subject of debate among supporters
and critics. See Lance Compa, American Unions and NAFTA, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
UNIONISM AT THE CURRENT STAGE OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION 97-
118 (Hideo Totsuka et al. eds., 1994) (proceedings of International Conference held at
Saitama University, Japan, Apr. 6-9, 1994); Lance Compa, Another Look at NAFTA, 44
DISSENT 45-50 (1997); Jefferson Cowie &John D. French, NAFTA's Labor Side Accord: A
Textual Analysis, LATIN Am. LAD. NEws, 1993-94, at 5. See also public comments received
by the Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation in connection with a four-
year review of the NAALC at <http//www.naalc.org>.
51. OSCAR ERMIDA URMRTE, MERCOSUR Y DERECHO LABoRAL (1996).
52. See Textos para Debate Internacional No. 7, Central Unica de los Trabajadores
(CUT) and Confederation Frangaise Democratique de Travail (CFDT),June 1996, at 23-
24; Marta Haines-Ferrari, MERCOSUR: A New Model of Latin American Economic Inte-
gration, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 413, 437 (1993); URLARTE, supra note 51.
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World Trade Organization, the International Labor Organization, and inter-
national financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.
Three principal UN instruments, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 53 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,54 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 55
(sometimes referred to as the "International Bill of Rights") treat an array
of workers' rights. They include both human rights matters (e.g., freedom
of association, forced labor, child labor) and economic and social issues
(e.g., decent wages, adequate health insurance, periodic holiday with pay).
While the WTO fended off direct treatment of labor concerns at its
December 1996 trade ministers' meeting, the ministers had to concede the
link between labor rights and trade.56 They declared that the ILO is the
proper arena for labor rights issues. However, labor rights advocates and
some governments (including the United States) are still pressing for a
labor rights link within WTO disciplines. 57
At its 1998 Conference, the ILO expanded its realm of "constitutional"
norms from Convention Nos. 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the
right to organize and bargain, to a set of "core" labor rights contained in
seven Conventions covering the right to bargain collectively, prohibitions
on forced labor, limits on child labor, and an end to race and sex discrimi-
nation in employment.58 Under ILO jurisprudence, every member state is
bound to respect such constitutional norms whether or not the country has
ratified the relevant ILO Convention. 59
After years of resisting links to social dimensions in their grant and
loan programs, the World Bank and the IMF have begun addressing labor
rights. The Bank's 1995 World Development Report was devoted to labor
market issues, and offered a definition of core workers' rights.60 In 1997,
the World Bank announced the creation of a Structural Adjustment Par-
53. G.A. Res. 217(lIl)(A), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
54. G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966).
55. G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966).
56. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Focus NEWsLErr- (World Trade
Org.), Jan. 1997, at 7.
57. See, e.g., Howard Wachtel, Labor's Stake in the WTO, AM. PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr.
1998, at 34-38. See also Gerard Baker, Clinton Urges New, Faster Trade Round, FIN. TimEs
(London), May 19, 1998, at 7 (discussing President Bill Clinton's call for the WTO to
deal with labor rights). For academic treatment, see Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade
Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition
to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 1, 36 (1996).
58. See ILO Core Conventions, ILO Focus (Washington Branch Office of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization, Washington, D.C.), Winter/Spring 1997.
59. This has particular relevance for the United States. Of the seven core conven-
tions, the United States has ratified only one: Convention No. 105 on the abolition of
forced labor. Id. Other countries that have ratified only one of the core conventions are
Bahrain, Cambodia, China, Laos, Qatar, Solomon Islands, United Arab Emirates, and
Zimbabwe. See id.
60. See World Bank, Workers in an Integrating World, in WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
78 (1995).
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ticipatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) to engage trade unions and non-govern-
mental organizations in reviews of Bank policy effects on workers and
other social actors. 6 1 In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, and particu-
larly in connection with developments in Indonesia, the IMF has conceded
a need to take workers' rights into account in its lending programs. 62
Additionally, the United States has moved towards new measures making
U.S. financial support of the Fund conditional upon labor rights
considerations. 63
D. Codes of Conduct
The proliferation of labor rights regimes does not stop with intergovern-
mental action. Private actors have formulated several "codes of conduct"
on labor rights in recent years. Prominent among them are brand name
companies including Levi's, Reebok, and Nike.64 Most recently, a group of
such firms negotiated the Apparel Industry Partnership with a coalition of
labor, religious, and human rights organizations. Their goal is to formulate
common labor standards and a common monitoring and enforcement
mechanism for labor rights in firm subsidiaries and subcontractors. 65
This brief survey of labor rights regimes in a variety of international
settings suggests the paltry nature of the labor rights language in the MAI.
International negotiators, heads of international organizations, national
legislators, and even some multinational corporate executives acknowledge
in the instruments they have produced that a labor rights regime worthy of
the name must go beyond the merely hortatory language contemplated for
the MAI. MAI negotiators should study other instruments for guidance in
formulating language that can gain support from labor rights advocates.
II. Features of a Labor Rights "Regime"
What does it mean to speak of a "labor rights regime" that might have
relevance for the MAI? Like any structured system of law, the more devel-
61. See Mark Suzman, World Bank to Assess Policy Impact on Poor, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 15, 1997, at 5.
62. See Ronald Brownstein, If Clinton Pushes, Asia's Breakdown Could Drive Labor
Reforms Forward, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1997, at A5.
63. See David E. Sanger, I.M.F. Loans to Rights Violators Are Attacked in Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1998, at 8.
64. See Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarr&re, Enforcing International
Labor Rights through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (1995);
Jorge Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Worker Rights through Business
Codes of Conduct, 17 FoRDHAm INT'L LJ. 1, 5-26 (1993); Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy
A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in
China, 14 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66, 67, 106-08 (1993). See also John H. Cushman Jr.,
Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Apply U.S. Rules Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1998,
at D1 (detailing promises Nike made to raise the minimum hiring age and to meet U.S.
air control standards in foreign factories).
65. See Pamela M. Prah, Clinton Endorses Plan to Curb Sweatshops Through Using
Code of Conduct, Monitoring, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Apr. 15, 1997, at A-1, E-5; Steven
Greenhouse, Apparel Industry Group Moves to End Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997,
at A14.
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oped systems of labor rights have four general aspects in common: 1) an
elaboration of norms; 2) a statement of obligations; 3) a method for filing
complaints and presenting evidence of violations; and 4) some measure of
sanctions when violations are found.
Within each of these aspects, a variety of features can be distin-
guished. This section reviews elements of the most prominent labor rights
regimes, and points out important differences within each. Such a "map-
ping" of elements in labor rights regimes and their optional features can
help guide the fashioning of a new regime for the MAI.
A. Cross-Border Norms: Core and Core-Plus
The first element in an international labor rights regime is a set of norms
with extraterritorial reach. Among current labor rights regimes, there are
two poles of normative formulations. One is devoted to a relatively narrow
"core." The other is more expansive. At extremes, the number of norms
can actually vary from one, such as with some corporate codes or social
labeling schemes which are limited to the issue of child labor,66 to the 176
Conventions of the ILO (although the ILO cites only seven as "human
rights" Conventions). 67
Inside these extremes, the elaboration of labor rights norms generally
follows "core" and "core-plus" tracks. The core track contains a limited
number of standards usually addressing freedom of association (and
related rights of organization and collective bargaining), forced labor, child
labor, and non-discrimination. The standards reflect fundamental human
rights that cannot vary based on a country's level of development.
Advocates of core standards argue that limiting a labor rights regime
to universal human rights standards sustains a consensus in favor of labor
rights. Sticking to a narrow, non-economic core disarms critics who see a
labor standards-trade link as a form of protectionism in disguise, meant to
deprive developing countries of their comparative advantage in low labor
costs.
6 8
The other current model goes beyond the so-called "core" to embrace
social and economic standards related to wages, hours, and working condi-
tions, usually bringing the number of specific standards closer to a dozen.
A wider set of norms is more responsive to workers' concrete concerns and
needs, and addresses some governments' attempts to gain trade advantages
through economic and social repression. For example, the NAFTA and the
66. The "Rugmark" program involves a code of conduct limited to the issue of child
labor. See Julie V. lovine, Must-Have Label: Rug Makers and Sellers Are Seeking Ways to
Trumpet Compliance with a New Child-Labor Law, N.Y. TIMi.s, Oct. 16, 1997, at Fl.
67. See ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND REcOMMENDATIONS (1992);
ILO, International Labor Organization-ILO Web Site (visited Dec. 12, 1998) <http://
www.ilo.org> (providing updates).
68. For an argument to this effect, see World Bank, supra note 60, at 78-79. See also
Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 56, which asserts: "We reject the use of
labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantages
of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into
question."
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EU set out eleven and twelve basic labor standards, respectively, that mix
human rights with social and economic concerns. Taken as a whole, the
UN's International Bill of Rights covers more than a dozen labor-related
concerns. 69 Most corporate codes of conduct contain more than core-
norm construction, but do not usually reach as many concerns as the
NAALC, EU, and UN formulations. Generally, they cover working hours
and occupational safety and health; rarely do they address cost factors like
wages and benefits beyond compliance with relevant domestic laws.
Scope of Norms in Selected International Labor Rights Instruments:
1) "Core" Norm Construction
Frameworks based on core labor standards include the following: 7
0
EU's GSP system:
7 1
- freedom of association;
- the right to bargain collectively;
- limits on child labor.
World Bank:72
- freedom of association;
- the right to collective bargaining;
- elimination of forced labor;
- elimination of exploitative forms of child labor;
- non-discrimination in employment.
OECD:7
3
- freedom of association;
collective bargaining;
- elimination of exploitative forms of child labor;
- prohibition of forced labor;
- non-discrimination in employment.
ILO Human Rights Conventions:74
69. See sources cited supra notes 53-55. These instruments address, inter alia, free-
dom of association, organizing and bargaining rights, forced labor, child labor, non-
discrimination, adequate wages, social security, workplace health and safety, limits on
working hours, paid holidays, and the right to strike.
70. Some of these formulations group either the right to organize or the right to
bargain collectively, but not both, with freedom of association. Others leave freedom of
association standing alone, and group organizing with the right to bargain collectively.
Still others place the rights of organizing and collective bargaining in separate categories.
These differences appear random, but they can be important. The difference between
organizing or collective bargaining as a manifestation of freedom of association, in con-
trast with organizing or collective bargaining as a means to economic ends, is critical in
determining workers' fundamental rights. A related debate is whether the right to strike
is based on freedom of association, and thus can be seen as a "core" human right, or
whether it is an instrument of "economic" bargaining that can be constrained by legisla-
tion. None of the core constructions, and only the NAALC among core-plus construc-
tions, contains the right to strike among its formulation of workers' basic rights. While
there is no ILO convention on the right to strike, ILO jurisprudence has established the
right to strike as an element of Conventions 87 and 98. See, e.g., ILO COFA Case No..
1543, 74 Official Bull., Ser. B., No. 2, 278th Rep., 15 (1991) (discussing the U.S. perma-
nent strike replacements doctrine).
71. See European Union, Council Regulation, supra note 47.
72. See World Bank, supra note 60, at 78.
73. See OECD, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE
WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 26 (1996).
74. Recall that these are the Conventions the ILO is seeking to elevate to constitu-
tionally binding status. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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- freedom of association and protection of the right to organize;
- the right to organize and bargain collectively;
- minimum age for admission to employment;
- abolition of forced labor (2 conventions);
- non-discrimination in employment;
- equal pay for men and women.
World Trade Organization:7 5
The WTO has affirmed a "commitment to the observance of internation-
ally recognized core [labour] standards" and declared that the ILO "is the
competent body to set and deal with these standards."7 6
2) "Core-Plus" Formulations:
U.S. GSP and other domestic U.S.trade laws (OPIC, Section 301 et al.): 77
- the right of association;
- the right to organize and bargain collectively;
- prohibition of forced labor;
- limits on child labor;
- "acceptable conditions" on minimum wages, hours of work, and occu-
pational safety and health;78
EU Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers:7 9
- the right to freedom of movement;
- free employment and fair remuneration;
- the improvement of living and working conditions;
- the right to social protection;
- the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining;
- the right to vocational training;
- the right of men and women to equal treatment;
- the right to information, consultation, and participation;
- the right to health and safety in the workplace;
- the protection of children and adolescents in employment;
- the protection of elderly persons in employment;
- protection of persons with disabilities in employment.
Labor Principles of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC): 80
- freedom of association and protection of the right to organize;
- the right to bargain collectively;
- the right to strike;
75. See Core Labour Standards, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996,
WTO Ministerial Conference, 36 I.L.M. 218, 221 (1997).
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
78. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4). U.S. legislation labels these norms "internationally
recognized worker rights," but does not ground them in ILO Conventions, international
human rights instruments, or any other internationally accepted definitions of labor
rights. What qualifies as "acceptable" conditions of labor, therefore, is what is found
"acceptable" to the particular U.S. agency conducting a review under the relevant stat-
ute. Significantly, the U.S. formulation does not include a universal core norm on non-
discrimination. A proposed non-discrimination clause was dropped from the draft legis-
lation at the insistence of Reagan administration officials concerned about Middle East
oil-producing allies. See Karen Travis, Women in Global Production and Worker Rights
Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, 17 YALE J. Iwr'L L. 1, 173 (1992).
79. See Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers, reprinted in EuRo-
PE~AN COMMUNiTY LAw SELECTED DocuMENTs 661-67 (George A. Bermann et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter Community Charter].
80. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I,L.M. 1499, 1515-16 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC].
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- prohibition of forced labor;
- labor protections for children and young persons;
- minimum employment standards, such as minimum wages and over-
time pay, covering wage earners, including those not covered by collec-
tive agreements;
- elimination of employment discrimination on the basis of such
grounds as race, religion, age, sex, or other grounds as determined by
each Party's domestic laws;
- equal pay for men and women;
- prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
- compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses;
- protection of migrant workers.
Apparel Industry Partnership Code of Conduct:8 1
- forced labor;
- child labor;
- harassment or abuse;
- non-discrimination;
- health and safety;
- freedom of association and collective bargaining;
- wages and benefits;
- hours of work;
- overtime compensation;
Levi Strauss Code of Conduct:8 2
- wages and benefits;
- working hours;
- child labor;
- prison labor/forced labor;
- non-discrimination;
- disciplinary practices (i.e. "corporal punishment or other forms of
mental or physical coercion").
Reebok Code of Conduct:83
- non-discrimination;
- working hours/overtime;
- forced or compulsory labor;
- fair wages;
- child labor;
- freedom of association;
- safe and healthy work environment.
B. Obligations Across Borders
Like the Cheshire Cat's grin, an elaboration of international labor norms is
just floating in air without attaching some level of obligation to respect the
norms. Like norms, obligations vary in their number and level of detail.
In some instruments, a single phrase announces the obligation, while in
others, a detailed statement lays out myriad obligations. They also vary in
81. See Report of Apparel Industry Partnership to President Clinton, Workplace Code
of Conduct, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 72, at E-5 (Apr. 15, 1997).
82. See Levi Strauss & Co., Business Partner Terms of Engagement and Guidelines
for Country Selection (on file with the Levi Strauss corporate office); Compa & Hinch-
liffe-DarricarrZ-re, supra note 64, at 677.
83. See Reebok Human Rights Production Standards (on file with Reebok corporate
office); Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrfre, supra note 64, at 681.
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their reach, sometimes binding governments only, sometimes binding pri-
vate actors as well.
U.S. and European GSP laws obligate developing countries to respect
labor rights norms or lose their GSP beneficiary status. In the U.S. GSP
scheme, the operative language imposing an obligation requires benefici-
ary countries to "tak[e] steps to afford" the five "internationally recognized
worker rights" defined in the Act.84 In contrast, Section 301 of the Trade
Act puts the obligation in the negative: U.S. trading partners are engaged
in "unreasonable" trade practices if they "deny" or "fail to provide" the five
rights.85 The EU's GSP regime requires countries to "undertake to respect"
standards on child labor, freedom of association and collective
bargaining.8 6
NAFTA's labor side accord says that the eleven Labor Principles are
"guiding principles that the Parties are committed to promote," but cau-
tions that they "do not establish common minimum standards for their
domestic law."87 The NAFTA labor accord defines six obligations of the
parties to the Agreement using operative obliging language such as "shall
ensure," "shall promote," and "shall provide." The six obligations consist
of maintaining high standards, effectively enforcing domestic labor laws,
providing for private rights of action, due process, and transparency in
labor tribunals, and publishing and publicizing labor laws and decisions.88
The European Union's Community Charter of Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers urges member states to guarantee the rights in the Char-
ter "in accordance with national practices" through legislation or collective
agreements.89 Binding obligations arise under complex EU voting proce-
dures that allow "Directives," the term for Europe-wide legislation, to be
adopted on subjects authorized by the Treaty as appropriate for EU
rulemaking. Directives bind EU members as to their results, but leave to
the individual countries the precise form of implementation of the Direc-
tive under domestic law.90
Some EU Directives may be adopted by qualified majority vote (a
weighted voting system meant to balance interests of large and small mem-
bers). This system prevents a single country from vetoing a Directive and
binds countries that vote against a Directive passed by a qualified majority.
84. "Taking steps" is an elastic statement of obligation that can give rise to conflict-
ing interpretations. In a legal challenge to the Bush administration's alleged non-
enforcement of the U.S. GSP law, for example, a court found that the "taking steps"
criteria was so broad that there was "no law to apply" and that the President enjoyed
complete discretion in enforcing the GSP labor rights provision. See ILRERF v. Bush,
752 F. Supp. 495, 497 (D.C. 1990), affd by a divided opinion, 954 F.2d. 745, 746 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
85. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1996).
86. See The Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 48.
87. NAALC, supra note 80, Annex 1 (Labor Principles).
88. Id. art. 2(Levels of Protection).
89. Community Charter, supra note 79, § 27.
90. For discussion of EU rulemaking procedures, especially regarding labor matters,
see Janice R. Bellace, The European Works Council Directive: Transnational Information
and Consultation in the European Union, 18 CoMP. LAB. LJ. 325 (1997).
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In the area of workers' rights, for example, the EU can adopt Directives by
qualified majority voting in matters of health and safety, working condi-
tions, information and consultation of workers, persons excluded from the
labor market, and equality between men and women. 9 1
For other subjects, binding Directives can only be adopted by unanim-
ity, which allows a single-country veto. Unanimity is required for Direc-
tives that deal with social security, job security, worker participation,
employment of third-country nationals, and job creation. 92
Still other topics cannot be made the subject of binding measures at
the European level under any circumstances. The EU precludes any Direc-
tives on union organizing, collective bargaining, or the right to strike.
European states reserve these matters to the domestic polity since they are
so integral to national character and so dependent on national history.93
The ILO's basic Conventions reflect subtle differences. ILO member
states must "undertake to give effect" to Convention No. 87 on freedom of
association and protection of the right to organize, while "measures appro-
priate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary" to imple-
ment Convention No. 98 on collective bargaining.94 Member states must
"undertake to suppress any form of forced labor" under Convention No.
105, but "undertake to pursue a policy" to abolish child labor under Con-
vention No. 138. 95 In these instances, the formulations "give effect" and
"suppress" suggest more decisive action than taking "appropriate meas-
ures" or pursuing a policy.
Corporate codes of conduct introduce a new definition of who is obli-
gated to comply with the norms contained in the code. The regimes dis-
cussed above put obligations on governments, leaving private firms subject
only to the domestic law of the countries where they do business and to the
vagaries of enforcement by domestic authorities. Depending on the coun-
try, labor law enforcement may be weak, underfunded, or corrupt. Codes
of conduct create obligations for companies, which can range from a princi-
pal enterprise that issues or signs the code, to subsidiaries and subcontrac-
tors to whom the principal company is applying the code.
Corporate codes of conduct obligate foreign subsidiaries or subcon-
tractors to comply with international norms or risk losing their commer-
91. See The Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 48, art. 118(1).
92. Id. art. 118(3).
93. Id. art. 118(6). Unresolved differences exist among EU partners on such issues
as exclusive representation versus plural unionism, majority unionism versus minority
unionism, compulsory union dues payment versus voluntary dues payment, compul-
sory arbitration versus voluntary arbitration, and other fault-line issues.
94. ILO, Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVETIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-
1991, at 435 (1992) (convention entered into forceJuly 4, 1950); ILO, Convention No. 98
Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collec-
tively, in id. at 524 (convention entered into force July 18, 1951).
95. ILO, Convention No. 105 Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, in id. at 618
(convention entered into force Jan. 17, 1959); ILO, Convention No. 138 Concerning the
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, in id. at 1030 (convention entered into force
June 19, 1976).
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cial relationship with the parent company. The Levi's code, for example,
states "[W]e will not utilize partners who use child labor in any of their
facilities."'96 Reebok states it will "apply the Reebok Human Rights Produc-
tion Standards in our selection of business partners."9 7 The Apparel
Industry Partnership requires any signatory company to "comply with" the
code, to "require its contractors ... to comply.., with this Code," and to
"condition future business with contractors and suppliers upon compli-
ance with the standards."9 8
C. Arenas to Test Compliance with Obligations
A third common element in a labor rights regime is the existence of a
forum or arena where compliance can be examined. This element nor-
mally involves a "complaint" mechanism that 1) permits an allegation that
a party has violated labor rights norms, 2) defines who may file such a
complaint, and 3) provides procedures for reviewing a complaint to deter-
mine whether or not a breach of obligations occurred.
The unilateral scheme in U.S. trade laws usually provides for an
administrative process where a complaint, often called a "petition," may be
lodged with the administrative agency responsible for the trade program.
In general, any "person" may file a complaint or petition under labor rights
provisions in U.S. trade law. This makes the process available to any trade
union, NGO, company or other organization, as well as concerned
individuals.
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) receives
petitions arguing that a country should be removed from GSP beneficiary
status because it is not "taking steps to afford" internationally recognized
worker rights.99 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
receives petitions for removal of countries from OPIC insurance eligibility
because of labor rights violations.' 0 0 The Treasury Department receives
requests for its delegates to the World Bank, IMF, and other international
lending institutions to use "voice and vote" against funds for governments
that violate workers' rights.1° 1 The Customs Bureau (a division of the
96. See sources cited supra note 82.
97. See sources cited supra note 83.
98. See Prah, supra note 65, at E-5, E-6.
99. Procedures for filing GSP labor rights complaints are found at 15 C.F.R. § 2007
(1998). Over 50 such petitions have been filed since the clause took effect in 1985, and
are on file at the GSP office of the Office of the United States Trade Representative,
Washington, D.C. Several countries have been removed or suspended from GSP benefici-
ary status, and some have been restored after labor rights improvements. See sources
cited infra note 103. See also U.S. GENERAL ACcouNTING OMCE, USGAO PUB. GAO/
GGD-95-9, INTERNATONAL TRADE - ASSESSmEN OF THE GENERALIZED SYsTEM OF PREFER-
ENcEs, at 107-08.
100. See, for example, United Auto Workers, Petition to Remove South Korea from
Coverage under the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (1988) and other OPIC
labor rights petitions (on file with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Wash-
ington, D.C.).
101. There are related requests by the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) on file
with the office of the United States delegation to the World Bank and with ILRF in
Washington, DC.
Cornell International Law Journal
Department of the Treasury) receives demands that goods allegedly made
by exploited child labor should be denied entry into the United States.10 2
In administering the GSP and OPIC labor rights clauses, the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) provide for public hearings in which inter-
ested parties, including petitioning labor and human rights organizations,
can testify. In addition to petitioners, government officials from countries
subject to a petition, their representatives, or employers implicated in a
petition, may appear at public hearings. Witnesses provide testimony to
and respond to questions from GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff
Committee (for GSP) or the OPIC President and top staff assistants (for
OPIC). l0 3
The same openness in the form of access to a complaint mechanism,
without strict "standing" requirements that allow only injured parties to
file complaints, also marks the NAALC's review procedures. Any "person,"
including trade unions, NGOs, and other organizations, may file a com-
plaint on any of the NAALC's eleven Labor Principles (technically the com-
plaint is called a "public communication" - international dispute
resolution language tends to the euphemistic). The complaint must be
filed with the National Administrative Office (a NAALC agency within
each country's labor department) of the country that seeks review of
another country's alleged failure to meet its obligations under the
NAALC. 0 4
Technically, complaints should allege a failure by a neighboring gov-
ernment to effectively enforce its domestic labor law. In practice, however,
most complaining unions and human rights organizations have targeted
corporations in their complaints. l05 More recently, systemic complaints
have been filed under several of the NAALC Labor Principles covering a
whole industry. 10 6
There are no citizenship requirements for filing a NAALC complaint.
One may file a complaint in another country's labor department about his
own country's failure to meet its obligations, or in their own country's
102. The first such demand was filed by the ILRF in November, 1997, and is on file
with the ILRF in Washington, D.C.
103. See 15 C.F.R. § 2007 (1998). See, e.g., petitions and testimony from the Interna-
tional Labor Rights Fund, the U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project, and other NGOs,
on file with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.
104. NAALC, supra note 80, art. 16(3); see also Revised Notice of Establishment of
United States National Administrative Office and Procedural Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg.
16,660-62 (1994) [hereinafter U.S. NAO Guidelines].
105. Cases filed thus far have alleged labor rights violations by General Electric, Hon-
eywell, Sony, Sprint, and other multinational firms. Petitions, reports of review, and
related materials are available from the National Administrative Office of each NAALC
country's labor department.
106. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Mexicans Were Denied U.S. Rights, Suit Says: A com-
plaint on behalf of migrant apple pickers in Washington State, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at
A18.
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labor department about another country's violations. 10 7 There is no
requirement that all domestic legal recourse be exhausted before a NAALC
complaint can be filed. 10 8
Public hearings on a complaint are conducted as a matter of course by
the United States National Administrative Office. 10 9  The Canadian
National Administrative Office may hold "public meetings or consulta-
tions."110 The NAO of Mexico contemplates "informative sessions" tanta-
mount to hearings."1 These hearings provide forums for both passionate
advocacy and public debate on alleged labor rights violations.
12
The NAO then reviews the country's labor law enforcement and issues
a written report, which can itself contain powerful criticism that generates
change.113 Optionally, the report may conclude with a recommendation
for ministerial consultation. This option gives rise to a new forum for pub-
lic intervention as ministers devise programs to address matters raised in
the complaints and treated in the reports.114 Most ministerial consulta-
tions have resulted in new public hearings and in workshops, seminars,
and other educational activities that have wide public participation." 15
As the power to move from first-stage review/consultation to second-
stage evaluation and then to third-stage arbitration under the NAALC's
three-stage complaint procedure reverts to governments, the scope of
review narrows. By itself, a government can invoke an evaluation by an
independent panel of experts of another country's alleged failure to meet
its NAALC obligations. 1 6 However, complaints concerning the first three
Labor Priciples, those dealing with freedom of association, collective bar-
107. For example, in recent NAALC complaints about alleged violations by a U.S.-
based auto parts manufacturer at its plant in Mexico, Canadian, U.S., and Mexican trade
unions filed complaints both in the United States and in Canada. See matters involving
Echlin Corp., on file with U.S. National Administrative Office, Washington, D.C., and
with National Administrative Office of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario.
108. U.S. NAO Guidelines, supra note 104, § G(3)(c).
109. Id. § H(3).
110. See Canadian NAO Guidelines for Public Communications Under Articles 16.3
and 21 of the NAALC, § 5(a) (available from Department of Human Resources Develop-
ment, Office of the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, Ottawa,
Ontario).
111. See SEc=EARIAT OF LABOR AtN SociAL WELFARE, WHAT Is THE MEXIcAN NATIONAL
ADMImsTRATIVE OmcE? 12 (1995).
112. See, e.g., Nancy Cleeland, Labor Panel Told of Problems at Tijuana Plant, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1998, at A3; Molly Moore, Mexican Farmhands Accuse U.S. Firms: Panel
Hears Washington Apple Pickers, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 1998, at A36.
113. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Sex Bias is Reported by U.S. At Border Plants in Mexico, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1998, at A8; Sam Dillon, Bias Said to Hurt Independent Mexican Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at A8.
114. NAALC, supra note 80, art. 22 (containing terms and conditions of ministerial
consultations).
115. See, e.g., Robert Collier, Sprint Accused Under NAFTA at S.F. Hearing, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 28, 1996, at A3; Compa, infra note 121, at 15-17 (discussing ministerial
consultations in the Sony, Sprint, and Pesca Union cases).
116. NAALC, supra note 80, art. 23(1). The Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE)
is composed of one private sector expert from each NAALC country. The committee
conducts a comparative review of labor law enforcement in all three countries on mat-
ters raised in the complaint.
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gaining, and the right to strike (called the "industrial relations principles"),
are not permitted to advance beyond review and optional ministerial con-
sultations following a review.1 1 7 The remaining eight principles are sub-
ject to treatment by an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE). Private
actors may participate in an evaluation through public hearings or other
devices employed by the independent evaluation committee." 8
Two of the three NAALC governments must agree to move a complaint
from the ECE to the arbitration stage." 9 However, alleged violations of
only three of the Labor Principles are subject to arbitration: those stem-
ming from child labor, minimum wage, and occupational health and safety
complaints. 120 No NAALC complaints have yet reached the arbitration
stage. 12 1
The European Union's mechanisms have a narrower scope of review
and stricter standing requirements than the NAALC. Complaints may not
be filed regarding every element of the Community Charter, but only with
respect to on those which have been implemented by binding Directives.
Directives have mostly been limited to matters of safety and health, non-
discrimination, and consultation with workers.12 2
Citizens or organizations claiming a violation of labor rights may com-
plain to the European Commission that their government has failed to
implement a Directive, at which point the Commission may take the matter
to the European Court of Justice. Alternatively, aggrieved individuals or
organizations may bring a complaint directly to the European Court alleg-
ing that their rights under EU Directives have been violated by their govern-
ment's failure to interpret national law in conformity with a Directive.
While the national government is the defendant, these proceedings impli-
cate the conduct of a corporation which can give rise to a domestic legal
proceeding. This opens the door to judicial scrutiny of employer conduct
and whether or not the employer violated employees' labor rights. 12 3
In the ILO, complaint mechanisms are not open to individual workers
or NGOs. Only trade union organizations, employer organizations, or gov-
ernments may file complaints with the ILO. Furthermore, with the excep-
117. Id. art. 23(3). The distinction is based on the definition of "technical labor stan-
dards" in NAALC Article 49 (Definitions). See NAALC, supra note 80. For a discussion,
see Lance Compa, Another Look at NAFTA, DIssENT, Winter 1997.
118. See Procedural Guidelines for Evaluation Committees of Experts (on file with the
Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, Dallas, Texas).
119. NAALC, supra note 80, art. 29(1). The arbitration panel is composed of five
non-governmental experts from the three countries.
120. Id.
121. For a fuller discussion of NAALC cases and procedures, see Lance Compa,
NAFTA's Labor Side Accord: A Three-Year Accounting, 3 NAFTA LAw AND Bus. REv. AM. 6-
23 (1997).
122. See generally THE SOCIAL DIMENSION: EMPLOYMENT POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COM.
MUNITY (Michael Gold ed., 1993); JAMES D. DINNAGE &JOHN F. MURPHY, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996).
123. For a broader discussion of EU complaint procedures, see Lisa Borgfeld White,
The Enforcement of European Union Law: The Role of the European Court of Justice and the
Court's Latest Challenge, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 833 (1996); Lenore Jones, Opinions of the
Court of the European Union in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 275 (1996).
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tion of the seven "core human rights," governments may only allege an ILO
Convention violation by another country's government if both countries
have ratified the relevant Convention. Within these constraints, however,
the ILO is judged to have the most comprehensive oversight system for
international norms.124
The United Nations provides ample forums for raising human rights
complaints, including labor rights violations. Complaints must be initiated
by governments, but hundreds of NGOs are officially recognized by the
UN. 125 They can influence their governments to lodge complaints, and
they may provide testimony and related information to UN agencies and to
a recently-created High Commissioner for Human Rights.12 6
D. Sanctions
Current international labor rights regimes contain a broad range of possi-
ble consequences for parties in violation of their obligation to comply with
labor rights norms. At one end of a sanctions continuum, quiet diplomacy
among governments, or between an international body and a government,
is the only result. No promise of remedial action lies in such "soft" reproof,
where the violator can ignore its critics. Dealings among "contact points"
in the OECD are an example of such "soft enforcement."' 27 However,
when such quiet diplomacy goes public, the force of public opinion should
not be underestimated. In some circumstances adverse publicity can
change behavior as effectively as economic sanctions.' 2 8
At the other end of the spectrum, some labor rights regimes provide
for "hard" reproof for violating workers' rights. At their strongest, these
measures take the form of trade sanctions such as the loss of favorable
tariff treatment or import bans. Such measures can be used to force cor-
rective action to cure a violation or to punish a violator who refuses to take
corrective action. For example, the GSP and other unilateral U.S. labor
rights clauses provide for the removal or suspension of beneficiary status.
Between 1986 and 1995, removal, suspension, or partial suspension of
GSP benefits resulting from labor rights violations were applied against
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Chile, Central African Republic, Burma, Liberia,
Syria, Sudan, Mauritania, Maldives, and Pakistan. 12 9 Nicaragua, Paraguay,
and Chile have since regained beneficiary status following improvements
in their labor rights.
124. For a comprehensive account of ILO procedures, see HPCTOR BARTOLOMEI DE LA
CRuz Er AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
SYSTEM AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS 67 (1996).
125. For a recent discussion of NGOs and the UN, see Steve Charnovitz, Two Centu-
ries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 249
(1997).
126. See The United Nations and Human Rights, N.Y. TiMs, Oct. 20, 1997, at A18.
127. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
128. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Nike Pledges to End Child Labor And Apply U.S. Rules
Abroad, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 1998, at DI.
129. Case summaries are available for review at the GSP Office of the USTR, Washing-
ton, D.C.; table of petitions and results on file with author.
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Between these two extremes of allegedly "toothless" moral suasion and
economically harmful trade sanctions lie several intermediate mechanisms.
They include self-reporting requirements, investigations, reviews and
reports by other governments, by international bodies, or by NGOs that
expose violations and generate public pressure for redress, consultations
among government ministries or with tripartite bodies that can lead to
remedial action, evaluations and recommendations by independent com-
mittees of experts, labeling requirements, fines, and others.
The oversight system established by the ILO contains a variety of
measures. Countries that have ratified a convention are subject to com-
plaints of violations by another ratifying country, or by a bona fide trade
union in any country. Constitutionally, all countries are bound by Con-
ventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the right to organize and
bargain collectively, and are subject to complaints whether or not they have
ratified them. These constitutional obligations have now been extended to
other "core" Conventions. 130 Moreover, all countries must report annually
on their progress toward ratification of ILO Conventions.
All countries potentially face investigations by a Committee of Experts
or Committee on Freedom of Association and findings that they have vio-
lated an ILO Convention. Although the ILO has no coercive power to com-
pel correction or to sanction a violator, reproof here takes the form of what
the ILO calls "the mobilization of shame." That is, the ILO hopes that pub-
lic exposure of violations and embarrassment before the international com-
munity will have the effect of correcting violations. 131
The NAALC's review stage results in a "report of review" characteriz-
ing the reviewed country's performance in enforcing its labor law, but stop-
ping short of outright accusation. Instead, the report may recommend
ministerial consultations on the matter. While there is no requirement for
corrective action and no prospect of sanctions to compel correction at this
stage of the NAALC process, reports and consultation can create embar-
rassing publicity for a government or employer that compels changed
behavior. 132 Sometimes, the mere prospect of a NAALC complaint may
effectively foster change. 133
Further NAALC proceedings show other elements of the sanctions
continuum. Following a review, an independent Evaluation Committee of
Experts investigates and files a report and recommendations on a coun-
try's alleged violation of its NAALC obligations. The ECE's recommenda-
tions are non-binding, but their implicit criticism would create an
130. See Declaration Affirms ILO Principles, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), July 6, 1998, at
D23.
131. The ILO points to several instances where the moral force of its findings put a
stop to labor rights violations. See DE LA CRUZ Er AL.., supra note 124, at 29-36, 106-07.
132. See Cleeland, supra note 112; Dillon, supra note 113; Collier, supra note 115.
133. In 1996, the government of Alberta dropped plans to privatize certain labor stan-
dards enforcement after public service unions announced plans to file a NAALC com-
plaint. See Allan Chambers, Privatization of Labor Rules Raises Fears: Law May Face
NAFTA Challenge, EDMONTON SUN, Sept. 6, 1996, at A6; Province's Halt of Privatization
Plan Ends Looming NAFTA Complaint, INSIDE NAFTA, Dec. 25, 1996, at 14.
Vol. 31
1998 MAI and International Labor Rights
expectation of response by a government and reproof, in the court of pub-
lic opinion, for failure to respond. 134
When one moves beyond the ECE level to arbitration, hard reproof
starts taking hold in the NAALC. The independent arbitral panel is
empowered to impose a fine of up to $20 million against an offending gov-
ernment.135 If a government fails to comply with an arbitral panel's order,
trade sanctions in the form of loss of preferential tariff treatment can be
imposed against firms or industrial sectors where the violations of work-
ers' rights occurred. 136
While there is no European police to enforce the judgments of the
European Court of Justice, the European Commission may obtain an order
from the ECJ to compel penalties in the form of monetary fines. These
fines are paid to the Commission if a country refuses to comply with a
court order. The court may also order a member state to pay monetary
damages to a citizen where the Court determines that the state's govern-
ment failed to implement or to respect an EU Directive, which led to a viola-
tion of the citizen's rights.
National courts are constrained to give effect to ECJ rulings, making
them enforceable under domestic law.13 7 In practice, no government has
openly spurned an order of the European Court in a labor-related matter,
since such an action would be tantamount to renouncing its EU
membership. 138
Conclusion
The purpose of this rapid survey of labor rights regimes is not to suggest
that any one of them is a model for the MAI. A generally positive assess-
ment of some features of these regimes, at least as compared with the MAI,
should not obscure the fact that each has been subjected to severe, well-
founded criticism. In view of the U.S. own serious, unremedied problems
of labor rights violations, 139 the GSP and related labor rights statutory
schemes in U.S. trade laws provoke charges of "aggressive unilateralism"
134. This reading is necessarily speculative. No case has proceeded to the ECE level
under the NAALC, although cases susceptible to ECE treatment have been filed and are
still under consideration at earlier review and consultation stages. See Compa, supra
note 50, at 50.
135. See NAALC, supra note 80, art. 39(4)(b), Annex 39. The amount of the fine
must be devoted to strengthening domestic labor law enforcement in the area that is the
subject of the complaint.
136. See id. art. 41, Annex 41B.
137. See Jones, supra note 123, at 281; White, supra note 123, at 860.
138. See Kevin Andrew Swartz, Powerful, Unique, and Anonymous: The European Court
of Justice and its Continuing Impact on the Formation of the European Community, 3 S. CAL.
INrERDisc. LJ. 687, 692 (1994).
139. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organiza-
tion Under the NLRA, 96 HAlv. L. Rev. 1769 (1983) (detailing widespread firing of
union supporters who seek to organize); SECRETAIAT OF rH COMMIsSION FOR LABOR
COOPERATION, PLANT CLOSINGS AND LABOR RIGHTS (1997) (detailing widespread use of
plant closing threats by U.S. employers to deter union organizing efforts and the ineffi-
cacy of U.S. labor law in preventing such conduct).
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and hypocrisy.140 In the EU, the adoption of Labor Rights Directives has
been limited to relatively uncontroversial issues like equal pay, occupa-
tional safety, and the consultation of workers, leaving a wide range of labor
rights untouched by European norms. Some critics call the EU labor rights
system a failure.14 1
The NAALC has come under fire for failing to create uniform labor
standards for the three nations in NAFTA and leaving existing domestic
laws undisturbed. This effectively locks in low standards where countries
are unwilling to improve them and blocks any "upward harmonization"
dynamic. Furthermore, while the NAALC sets forth eleven Labor Princi-
ples, only three are susceptible to arbitration and potential sanctions:
those on child labor, minimum wage, and safety and health. Vital labor
standards on freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to bar-
gain collectively, and the right to strike cannot pass beyond the initial,
arguably "toothless" review and optional ministerial consultation stage of
the NAALC process. In any case, specific remedies such as reinstatement
of fired workers or recognition of migrant workers' unions are not available
under the NAALC. 142
The United Nations and the ILO have commendable oversight systems
that call on countries to account for human rights and labor rights viola-
tions. However, they have no power to enforce their decisions or otherwise
to change the behavior of recalcitrant labor rights violators. The WTO has
not yet integrated labor rights into its disciplines, preferring to refer the
issue to the ILO. 143
Corporate codes of conduct arise mainly from brand name retailers
concerned with their image among consumers. Their stance on labor
rights seems to be more of a response to the degree of uproar in the buying
public than a commitment to sustained efforts to promote labor rights for
their employees. Such codes are not catching on with companies less
140. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: "Aggressive
Unilateralism?", in HuMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 71 (Lance A.
Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
141. For art overview of the "failure" arguments, see DAVID M. TRUBEK, SOCIALJUsTIcE
"AFTER" GLOBALIZATION: THE CASE OF SOCIAL EUROPE (MacArthur Consortium Research
Series on International Peace and Cooperation No. 9, Dec. 1996), and sources cited
therein, including Stephen J. Silvia, The Social Charter of the European Community: A
Defeat for European Labor, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rv. 626 (1991).
142. For a representative criticism of the insufficiency of remedies under the NAALC,
see Jerome I. Levinson, NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement: Lessons from the First Three Years,
in INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FUND (1996).
143. For a view that the ILO is ineffective, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Remarks at
Meeting of the Section on International Law of the American Association of Law
Schools, in International Trade and Social Welfare: The New Agenda, 17 COMP. LAB. Lj.
338, 351 (1996), which argues that few nations have complied with ILO Conventions
and that the ILO's impact on international law has been minimal. On the WTO, see
Martin Khor, The World Trade Organisation, Labour Standards, and Trade Protectionism,
in THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE 30 (1994), which argues that labor rights advocates in
developed countries are really motivated by protectionism and would use WTO disci-
plines to further impoverish developing countries.
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dependent on consumer goodwill.144
Rather than looking for models, this review has sought to demonstrate
the richness of labor rights discourse in the past two decades and the vari-
ety of approaches found in other labor rights instruments that might
inform MAI negotiators in any resumed talks on an international invest-
ment agreement. The NAALC is perhaps the most variegated and flexible
labor rights regime to take shape in recent years and is worth further study
for shaping new international agreements with a labor rights dimension. It
provides continuing opportunities for cooperation and consultation among
governments. At the same time, it provides a contentious complaint mech-
anism readily accessible to workers, unions, and human rights advocacy
groups.
The NAALC does not create uniform supranational standards or a
new supranational enforcement agency but rather preserves national sover-
eignty over labor law matters. However, it does create obligations for effec-
tive labor law enforcement susceptible to reviews by other parties and to
evaluation, and in some cases arbitration, by independent, non-govern-
mental experts in labor law.
In the long run, the approach contained in the NAALC may move the
parties in the direction of harmonized standards and enforcement. If so,
this will be accomplished over a long period and at a pace that allows for
education, acceptance, and adjustment as the process unfolds. Such a long
term evolution is preferable to a Procrustean bed of norms and mecha-
nisms applied immediately in countries as diverse as Canada, the United
States, and Mexico.
What, then, might a labor rights component, informed by the NAALC
and by other labor rights regimes, look like in the MAI?
Core-Plus Norms
A labor rights-enhanced MAI should affirm a broad set of labor rights and
labor standards that begin with core rights and go on to embrace economic
and social protections, including wages, benefits, and job security, that are
vital to protecting workers against the ravages of unmediated free market
policies.
Obligations That Bind States and Enterprises
A labor rights clause in the MAI should create binding obligations on both
signatory governments, ensuring that they will implement and effectively
enforce the norms, and on multinational enterprises and investors that
avail themselves of the benefits of an investment agreement, ensuring that
they will comply with the labor rights norms of the agreement. The latter
could be accomplished by expanding and strengthening the OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, making the Guidelines a binding code
of conduct.
Complaint Forums and Mechanisms
144. See, e.g., Wendy Bounds & Hilary Stout, Sweatshop Pact: Good Fit or Threadbare?
Industry Could Get a PR Boom, but Activists Worry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1997, at A6;
Glenn Burkins, Clinton Plan to Eliminate Sweatshops in Apparel Industry Called Too Weak,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at A2.
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MAI negotiators should establish an arena where workers, unions, human
rights organizations, employers, and governments may file complaints
alleging a violation of labor rights norms and obligations. A complaint
mechanism could be constructed anew, or it might retain elements of the
existing mechanism under the OECD Guidelines (but eliminating the fic-
tion that it is only an "enquiry" where accused labor rights violators cannot
be named). It may also be possible to use ILO oversight mechanisms to
provide a neutral fact-finding function and an assessment of whether an
alleged violation indeed contravenes labor rights norms and obligations.
The ILO's factual determinations could then be taken up under MAI dis-
pute resolution mechanisms.
Any complaint mechanism should provide opportunities for public
hearings and public participation in review, evaluation, and dispute settle-
ment procedures. At the same time, there should be ample opportunity for
cooperation, consultation, technical assistance, and other measures that
provide a way out of a contentious dispute, allowing parties to settle
problems and exit gracefully from the glare of international scrutiny.
Escalating Sanctions
Developing countries rightly question the use of labor rights clauses for
protectionist purposes, and developed countries must take care not to let
the arrogance of superior economic power drive heavy-handed economic
reprisals against weaker countries. A balanced labor rights regime should
provide a brief, defined period in which quiet diplomacy - which may in
fact require the creation of a new function of international labor concilia-
tion and mediation - can find a solution to a labor rights crisis, or at least
steady improvement toward a solution. If an initial behind-the-scenes
approach is unavailing, a next stage might involve investigation and critical
reporting by a permanent labor rights office in the OECD (or WTO, if the
MAI re-emerges there), or reliance on ILO oversight steps. Such a review
and reporting stage should allow opportunity for response and correction
of the problem in light of the report.
A next stage might involve a further investigation, with a report and
recommendation by a distinguished group of experts which squarely chal-
lenges the labor rights violator to comply with the recommendations or to
declare publicly its intention not to comply. Such defiance would finally
trigger economic sanctions ranging from a fine to loss of MAI guarantees in
such areas as national treatment, performance requirements, MFN, or
expropriation. In short, sanctions must be available for any labor rights
regime to be credible and effective, but sanctions should only come after
ample opportunities to resolve disputes without them.
MAI negotiators, when and if they reconvene to fashion an interna-
tional investment agreement, should take these elements into account in
adding a labor rights dimension to any new agreement. If instead they stay
close to the paltry language of the labor rights clauses in the 1998 draft
analyzed here, the human rights and labor rights advocacy communities
should again mobilize to halt a MAI that fails to protect workers.
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